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Abstract
This article begins the process of evaluating the adequacy of the procedural and substantive
requirements that Australian communications regulators (and hence industry bodies) must
satisfy before co-regulatory codes of practice can be registered. It considers if the procedural
requirements relating to consumer and public consultation, included in the statutory frame-
works that authorise and govern co-regulation in the media, online and telecommunications
sectors, ensure co-regulatory rule-making is sufficiently responsive to the interests of con-
sumers and citizens. Drawing on publicly available information about seven industry bodies
that have drafted codes of practice and round table discussions with industry, consumers and
regulators, the article highlights that the current engagement practices of industry bodies
often fall short of the ‘democratic credentials’ of responsiveness. It suggests that the code
registration criteria relating to consumer and public consultation must be overhauled if these
weaknesses are to be rectified.
* Dr Karen Lee is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS). The author may be
contacted at Karen.Lee@uts.edu.au.
** Dr Derek Wilding is Co-Director of the Centre for Media Transition at UTS. The author may be contacted at Derek.
Wilding@uts.edu.au.
yOur research was made possible by funding received from the Australian Communications Consumer Action Network
(ACCAN), the Faculty of Law, UTS and the School of Law, University of New England, where Dr Lee was previously
employed. Funding received from ACCAN is made possible by funding provided by the Commonwealth of Australia under
section 593 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). This funding is recovered from charges on telecommunications
carriers. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of ACCAN. Our research was
approved by the UTS Human Research Ethics Committee (ETH 17-1830). We wish to thank the two anonymous
referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Federal Law Review
1–31






Over the last three decades, co-regulation—‘when [an] industry develops its own code or accred-
itation scheme and this has legislative backing’1—has become an important component of the
framework used to regulate the Australian communications sector. Since as early as 1992, ‘bodies
and associations’ representing traditional broadcasters—providers of free-to-air television and
radio services and subscription broadcasting services2—have had the right to draft codes for
registration by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) and its predeces-
sors. Bodies and associations representing ‘sections of the telecommunications industry’ acquired
the right in 1997.3 Bodies and associations representing ‘[t]he internet service provider section of
the internet industry’ obtained the right in 19994 and 2001;5 and ‘sections of the content industry’
in 2007.6 All are expected, and in some cases may be requested,7 to formulate codes and seek their
registration with ACMA or the eSafety Commissioner, who are obliged to register any codes they
submit for registration provided they meet specified statutory criteria. If industry bodies and
associations (industry bodies) do not develop codes or registered codes developed by them ‘fail’,
then ACMA or the eSafety Commissioner may, in specified circumstances, adopt an industry
standard.8 Since being given the responsibility to draft codes, industry bodies have drafted numer-
ous codes dealing with a variety of matters such as content and programming standards, billing,
complaint handling and debt collection, the best known of which are the Commercial Television
Industry Code of Practice and the Telecommunications Consumer Protections Code (TCP Code).9
The former imposes obligations relating to matters such as accuracy in news, classification of
programs and restrictions on advertising; the latter imposes obligations, among others, relating to
advertising, sales, contracts and credit management.
1. This definition, which reflects widespread understanding of the term within the communications industry in Australia,
was adopted in Department of Communications, Regulating Harms in the Australian Communications Sector:
Observations on Current Arrangements (Policy Background Paper No 2, May 2014) 10 (‘Regulating Harms’). In
this article, we differentiate co-regulation, as defined above, from self-regulation (meaning voluntary rules developed
by industry without legislative backing or regulator enforcement) and direct regulation (meaning legislation and rules
developed under legislation by government or regulators). Our approach is largely consistent with how the terms are
used in the 2014 Policy Background Paper (see pp 6 and 15), except that we use ‘direct regulation’ in place of ‘black
letter law’.
2. See Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) (‘BSA’) pt 9. Although the BSA in 1992 anticipated codes for subscription
television broadcasting services (pay TV), these services did not commence until 1995.
3. See Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) (‘TA’) pt 6.
4. See BSA (n 2) sch 5 pt 5 (introduced by the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999 (Cth)). Codes
must deal with matters such as procedures to ensure children do not access online accounts without the consent of
parents or responsible adults.
5. Part 4 of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 (Cth) (‘IGA’) refers to ‘a body or association’ that ‘represents internet
service providers’.
6. See BSA (n 2) sch 7 pt 4 (introduced by the Communications Legislation Amendment (Content Services) Act 2007 (Cth)).
‘Sections of the content industry’ include hosting service providers, live content service providers, links service
providers and commercial content service providers; in all cases, the services must have an Australian connection.
7. See, eg, TA (n 3) s 118; BSA (n 2) sch 5 pt 5 cl 63; IGA (n 5) s 39; BSA (n 2) sch 7 pt 4 cl 86.
8. BSA (n 2) s 125; TA (n 3) ss 123, 125; BSA (n 2) sch 5 pt 5 cls 68, 70; IGA (n 5) ss 44, 46; BSA (n 2) sch 7 pt 4 cls 91, 93.
With the exception of Part 9 of the BSA, comparable powers to develop industry standards exist in the other four
frameworks if there are no bodies or associations representing industry interests.
9. See Free TV Australia, Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (2015); Communications Alliance Ltd,
Industry Code C628: Telecommunications Consumer Protections Code (2019).
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As the regulatory framework is adapted for the converged communications industry,
co-regulation is likely to remain a feature of the communications regulatory landscape. This is
so, even though government itself has questioned whether co-regulation should be ‘the default
approach to dealing with regulatory harms’.10 In practice, government and regulators have recently
relied on (or are intending to rely on) both self-regulation and direct regulation11 to address
problems confronting the industry. While self-regulation is being used in relation to disinformation
and news quality on digital platforms,12 new rules were issued by ACMA to address difficulties
experienced by consumers when transitioning to the NBN (difficulties that were attributed in part
to weaknesses in the co-regulatory TCP Code13), and new legislation has been proposed to address
the bargaining imbalance between Australian news media businesses and Google and Facebook
(where initial attempts as self-regulation were curtailed by government intervention).14 Neverthe-
less, in its final report on the review of ACMA published in 2017, the then Department of
Communications identified ‘promot[ing] the greatest practical use of co-regulation and self-reg-
ulation’ as an important principle of regulatory design. The Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission then noted that the same principle should inform the development of the harmonised,
platform-neutral media regulatory framework it recommended in its Final Report of its Digital
Platform Inquiry.15 And in December 2019, the then Department of Communications and the Arts
proposed that a wider range of online service providers be permitted to develop ‘principles-based
codes’ that address ‘harmful content’.16
However, even though co-regulation has been a feature of the communications landscape for
the last 28 years and is likely to be in the future, there has been no comprehensive review or
assessment, by academic scholars, government and regulators,17 of the adequacy of the procedural
and substantive requirements that communications regulators (and hence industry bodies) must
satisfy before codes are registered.
This article begins that process. It considers whether the procedural requirements relating to
consumer and public consultation included in each of the five statutory frameworks that authorise
and govern co-regulation in the sector ensure co-regulatory rule-making is sufficiently responsive
to the interests of consumers and citizens. It asks whether amendments are needed to the five
frameworks which require ACMA or the eSafety Commissioner to be satisfied that either
10. Regulating Harms (n 1) 44; Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications,
Consumer Safeguards Review: Part C/Choice and Fairness Consultation Paper (July 2020) 10 (‘Consumer Safeguards
Review’).
11. See above n 1 for definitions of self-regulation and direct regulation.
12. See, eg, Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), Misinformation and News Quality on Digital
Platforms in Australia: A Position Paper to Guide Code Development (June 2020).
13. Joint Standing Committee on the National Broadband Network, The Rollout of the National Broadband Network: 1st
Report of the 45th Parliament (29 September 2017) 98–9. For an example of the new ACMA rules, see the
Telecommunications (NBN Consumer Information) Industry Standard 2018 (Cth).
14. See, eg, Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) Bill 2020 (Cth);
Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining
Code) Bill 2020 (Cth).
15. See, eg, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report (July 2019) ch 4.
16. See Department of Communications and the Arts, Online Safety Legislative Reform: Discussion Paper (December
2019) 40–1.
17. At the time of writing, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications is
undertaking a review of Part 6 of the TA (n 3). See generally Consumer Safeguards Review (n 10).
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‘members of the public have been given an adequate opportunity to comment on the code’ before
registering broadcasting codes18 or industry bodies have ‘invited members of the public to make
submissions’ about draft codes within a specified period.19 It also considers if an obligation to be
satisfied that ‘at least one body or association that represents the interests of consumers has been
consulted about the development of the code’, currently imposed on ACMA when it registers a
code applicable to sections of the telecommunications industry, should be revised and incorporated
into all current and future statutory frameworks governing co-regulation.20
The article starts by defining responsiveness—a principle of regulatory design which calls for
sensitivity to the ‘targets of regulation’21 that has been highly influential since the 1990s—but
which has never been clearly delineated. It will be argued that responsiveness should mean the
weighing up of alternatives and determination of what, on balance, meets the needs of all stake-
holders; the exercise of some independent judgement by industry; the disclosure by industry to
participants in the rule-making process of information necessary to hold it to account; and the
explanation and justification by industry of its position to others.
After identifying the seven industry bodies that currently participate in co-regulatory rule-
making in the media, online and telecommunications sectors, the article then sets out their rule-
making frameworks and the mechanisms they use to engage with consumers and citizens. Their
engagement mechanisms are considered in detail because the statutory obligations of consumer
and public consultation were intended by Parliament to be ‘additional to any opportunities the
industry may provide.’22 It will be highlighted that the seven industry bodies have used a range of
mechanisms, during the different stages of rule-making, to involve consumers and citizens and
understand their concerns. However, with some notable exceptions, they tend to involve consu-
mers, citizens and related organisations late in the process (ie, after regulatory issues have been
framed and rules have been drafted) and to rely on two engagement mechanisms: complaints data
collected by themselves or a regulatory body, and the provision of an opportunity to make written
submissions on draft codes. Moreover, when assessed against the criteria of responsiveness
adopted in this article, industry’s reliance on the engagement mechanisms of complaints data and
written submissions, appears to fall short because consumers and citizens confront a number of
‘barriers to participation’23—the same (or similar) barriers that have hindered their participation in
traditional administrative rule-making. The article concludes by suggesting that the code registra-
tion criteria relating to consumer and public consultation should be overhauled if these weaknesses
are to be remedied.
As both the rule-making activities of industry bodies and code registration processes of the
regulators are confidential, our analysis draws primarily on empirical data gathered during round
18. This obligation applies to ACMA when registering codes under Part 9 of the BSA (n 2).
19. This obligation applies to ACMA when registering codes under Part 6 of the TA (n 3) and under Part 4 of the IGA (n 5);
and to the eSafety Commissioner when registering codes under Schedules 5 and 7 of the BSA (n 2).
20. See TA (n 3) s 117.
21. Christine Parker and John Braithwaite, ‘Regulation’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003) 119, 128.
22. See, eg, Explanatory Memorandum, Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Bill 1999 (Cth) 51; Revised
Explanatory Memorandum, Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Bill 1999 (Cth) 57; Explanatory
Memorandum, Interactive Gambling Bill 2001 (Cth) 52.
23. Cynthia Farina et al, ‘Democratic Deliberation in the Wild: The McGill Online Design Studio and the Regulation
Room Project’ (2014) 41(5) Fordham Urban Law Journal 1527, 1550 (‘Democratic Deliberation in the Wild’).
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table discussions with industry, consumer and regulators.24 It also draws on the limited information
about the internal rule-making processes of industry bodies that could be found in the public
domain. All publicly available information that could be located was summarised and provided
to each industry body for comment. Feedback and/or additional information were received from
six of the seven industry bodies that engage in co-regulatory rule-making in the communication
sector.
II The Purpose of Public Engagement in Co-Regulatory Rule-Making
Before identifying the seven industry bodies which have drafted codes and explaining their rule-
making frameworks and mechanisms of consumer and public engagement, it is essential to identify
the underlying purpose for which their consumer and public engagement mechanisms are being
used. This often overlooked step is important because, as scholars of participation design empha-
sise, clarification of purpose can avoid wasted time and effort and minimise conflict that differing
sets of expectations, held by interested parties, may cause.25
Freiberg has noted that engagement with those who might be affected by or have an interest in
regulation is a requirement of good regulatory process, and indeed, of public policy in general.26
He also notes that engagement is needed for a range of practical purposes such as understanding the
nature of a problem and how people might be affected by regulatory proposals.27 ACMA has
explained the purpose of public consultation in the following terms: ‘Public consultation on a draft
code must take place to allow community concerns to be identified and evaluated’.28
It is suggested here that the function of public engagement in co-regulatory rule-making should
be evaluated by reference to responsiveness. Responsiveness is suggested because it has been and
remains a highly influential principle of regulatory design. It underpins many of the best known
strategies of regulation, such as ‘responsive regulation’,29 ‘smart regulation’,30 ‘democratic experi-
mentalism’,31 ‘collaborative governance’32 and ‘really responsive regulation’,33 that encourage
24. One round table was held for each set of stakeholders. The Consumer and Regulator Round Tables were held on 9 May
2019; the Industry Round Table was held on 10 May 2019. All round tables were semi-structured. The Industry Round
Table included representatives from bodies engaged in self-regulatory rule-making and bodies engaged in
co-regulatory rule-making.
25. See, eg, John M Bryson et al, ‘Designing Public Participation Processes: Theory to Practice’ (2013) 73(1) Public
Administrative Review 23, 26.
26. Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (Federation Press, 2017) 158.
27. ‘Consultative and inclusive’ are some of several matters Freiberg nominates as the ‘principles of good regulation’:
Freiberg (n 26) 157–69.
28. ACMA, ‘The ACMA Registers New Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice’ (Media Release 56/2015, 10
November 2015).
29. See, eg, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford
University Press, 1992); John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better
(Edward Elgar, 2008).
30. Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford University Press,
1998).
31. Michael C Dorf and Charles F Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98(2) Columbia Law
Review 267.
32. See, eg, Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice’ (2008) 18(4) Journal of
Public Administration Theory and Practice 543.
33. Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) The Modern Law Review 59.
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industry actors to participate in regulatory activities, including rule-making, once seen as the
exclusive duties of the state. Indeed, for each strategy, responsiveness is a prerequisite for reg-
ulatory effectiveness—the achievement of the public policy goals set by the state. The desire to be
responsive has also been cited as a justification, if not the sole justification, for co-regulation by
governments, legislators and policymakers in Australia and worldwide. For example, the expla-
natory memoranda that accompanied the legislation that enables traditional broadcasters in Aus-
tralia to develop and seek the registration of codes stated the rationale for its provisions was the
desire to avoid the ‘social costs’ of ‘formal regulation’ that ‘can deprive industry of the opportunity
to devise a flexible and responsive approach to meeting the demands and needs of the
community’.34
Despite its influence in regulatory and government circles, as we note below, responsiveness
has largely been understood in terms of compliance and enforcement, rather than in relation to
rule-making; this may explain the absence of a clear and comprehensive definition of the term. We
suggest that, in the rule-making context, it describes a process that accords with the rationales that
underpin the principles of procedural and institutional legitimacy in legislative and administrative
rule-making in democratic countries—two of the four values of the rule of law that are said to give
law its legitimacy. The legitimacy of rules and rule-making can also be socially constructed;
individuals and organisations accept rules and rule-making for numerous reasons, one of which
may be compliance with rule of law norms.35 However, in our view, responsiveness (as properly
understood in the regulatory literature on which we draw) is not concerned with the various reasons
why individuals and organisations perceive rules and rule-making to be legitimate. Rather its focus
is to ensure the minimum requirements of procedural and institutional legitimacy of the rule of law
are satisfied.
A The Meaning of Responsiveness
The vast majority of the regulatory literature dealing with responsiveness has focused on its
requirements in the context of compliance and enforcement.36 Because of the literature’s focus,
it is assumed that responsiveness centres exclusively on the relationship of regulators with their
regulatees and the factors regulators should consider when seeking to enforce and ensure com-
pliance with the law37—factors such as enforcement ‘styles’,38 ‘motivational postures’,39 ‘the
operating and cognitive frameworks of firms’ and the ‘institutional environments’ of regulatory
34. Explanatory Memorandum, Broadcasting Services Bill 1992 (Cth) 66–7 (emphasis added). The same statement appears
in Explanatory Memorandum, Broadcasting Services Bill 1992 (Cth) (Revised) 61.
35. See, eg, Mark C Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) 20(3) Academy of
Management Review 571; Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2(2) Regulation & Governance 137.
36. This point is made by Christine Parker, ‘Twenty Years of Responsive Regulation: An Appreciation and Appraisal’
(2013) 7(1) Regulation & Governance 2, 4; Karen Lee, The Legitimacy and Responsiveness of Industry Rule-making
(Hart, 2018) 208; Seung-Hun Hong and Jong-sung You, ‘Limits of Regulatory Responsiveness: Democratic
Credentials of Responsive Regulation’ (2018) 12(3) Regulation & Governance 413, 414.
37. Hong and You (n 36) 414.
38. Peter J May and Robert S Wood, ‘At the Regulatory Front Lines: Inspectors’ Enforcement Styles and Regulatory
Compliance’ (2003) 13(2) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 117.
39. See, eg, Valerie Braithwaite et al, ‘Regulatory Styles, Motivational Postures, and Nursing Home Compliance’ (1994)
16(4) Law & Policy 363.
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regimes (among others).40 However, the concept of responsiveness is also relevant to the rule-
making context, and it is increasingly being recognised and emphasised that responsiveness, as
envisaged by its leading architects, should not be confined to the narrow technical understandings
often associated with it.41 Rather, it needs and has an explicit normative democratic underpin-
ning—an underpinning that requires regulators and regulatees to take into account ‘the needs of the
broader public, including stakeholders and the general public’42—if the pitfalls of regulatory
capture43 are to be avoided. Two approaches to understanding responsiveness in the context of
rule-making are considered before we evaluate them and set out the definition we will use to assess
consumer and public engagement practices of industry bodies in Section IV.
1 Approaches. Writing about the confidential code development process of the Communications
Alliance (Comms Alliance), which represents sections of the telecommunications industry and—
since the Internet Industry Association (IIA) ceased its operations in 2014—internet service
providers and other providers that constitute sections of the content industry, one of the co-
authors has suggested that responsiveness should be defined by reference to the rationales that
underpin the principles of deliberation, impartiality, transparency and accountability—the four
principles that give procedural and institutional legitimacy to rule-making by legislative and
administrative bodies.44
Three reasons for adopting this approach are given. First, the rationales for deliberation,
impartiality, transparency and accountability are consistent with the principle of non-
domination, central to republican theories of democracy.45 This principle implicitly underpins
Ayres and Braithwaite’s Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate and the
four techniques of responsive enforcement they develop therein: the pyramid, tripartism, enforced
self-regulation and partial-industry intervention. Second, deliberation, transparency, accountabil-
ity and impartiality are compatible with pluralism and deliberative democracy—the other two
theories of democracy that it has been suggested provide a normative basis for the various reg-
ulatory strategies mentioned earlier.46 Third, use of these standards is consistent with the concep-
tions of law and society assumed by proponents of these strategies. These include the ideas that
society is divided into a series of autonomous spheres, and the function of law is to coordinate the
‘impact’ the various spheres have on each other by using procedural mechanisms that seek to
encourage dialogue, participation and deliberation between the different spheres.47
Under this approach, deliberation retains its original meaning—‘the weighing up of alternatives
and determination of what (on balance) meets the needs of all stakeholders’.48 However, the
precise meanings of impartiality, transparency and accountability are revisited and adjusted in
40. Baldwin and Black (n 33) 59.
41. See, eg, Julia Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part 1’ (2000) 20(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597, 607; Lee
(n 36); Hong and You (n 36).
42. Hong and You (n 36) 418.
43. See, eg, Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29) 54–5; Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite, ‘In and Out of the Revolving Door:
Making Sense of Regulatory Capture’ (1992) 12(1) Journal of Public Policy 61; Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, ‘The Benefits
of Capture’ (2012) 47(2) Wake Forest Law Review 569.
44. Lee (n 36) 12–13, ch 9.
45. See, eg, Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Clarendon Press, 1997) ch 2.
46. Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part 1’ (n 41) 607.
47. For the arguments developed in full, see Lee (n 36) 209–22.
48. Ibid 225.
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order to decouple them from the mechanisms that lawyers believe confer procedural and institu-
tional legitimacy when legislators and administrators engage in rule-making (mechanisms such as
‘the hard look doctrine’, ‘disinterested and professional’ administrative decision-makers and judi-
cial review), and to ensure they remain relevant when industry is permitted to take part in (or
assume responsibility for) the formation of legally binding rules.49 Impartiality, which is com-
monly understood as acting without self-interest, is modified to mean whether industry has con-
sidered the relevant concerns of others before it reaches it decisions: in other words, whether it has
exercised ‘some independent judgement’.50 Rather than imposing an obligation of full and com-
plete disclosure of information to the public, transparency mandates ‘the disclosure of a sufficient
amount of relevant information by industry to enable stakeholders and others to hold it to
account’.51 Instead of entitling principals such as citizens to ‘seek information, explanation and
justification’52 from agents such as Parliament and to impose some form of sanction retrospec-
tively if they fail to comply with their instructions, the focus of accountability becomes a search for
‘real-time’ mechanisms that ensure industry answers for its decisions or explains itself to others.
The traditional definition of impartiality was adapted because requiring industry bodies to
satisfy that threshold was unrealistic; industry would automatically fail to meet any such test. It
was also inconsistent with the central purpose of allowing industry bodies to formulate their own
rules: channelling self-interest by requiring industry to take the interests and concerns of all other
parties into account. Expecting industry to consider the relevant concerns of others before it
reached it decisions, it was argued, was more consistent with the aim of industry rule-making and
served the same function that a traditional understanding of impartiality was intended to encour-
age: listening to the views of all parties during discussion and critical assessment of the merits of
their arguments.53
Transparency, which has frequently (but not exclusively) been understood to require full and
complete disclosure, was more narrowly defined because industry rule-making often takes behind
closed doors, and if such a ‘strong-form’ conception of transparency54 were adopted for this
context, industry bodies would automatically fail this requirement too. However, provided industry
disclosed a sufficient amount of relevant information to key stakeholders, directly involved in the
rule-making process—including consumer representatives—the confidentiality of industry rule-
making could be reconciled with the two underlying objectives of wider conceptions of transpar-
ency: ensuring deliberation is not compromised by the presence of the self-interests of lawmakers
and facilitating accountability of rule-makers.55
The traditional analytical framework of accountability, which typically centres around ques-
tions of ‘who is accountable?’, ‘to whom?’ and ‘for what?’,56 was judged to be inappropriate for
evaluating rule-making by the Comms Alliance because it is premised on three assumptions that
cannot be made in that context: (1) the existence of some form of hierarchy between a principal and
agent; (2) the ability of the principal to clearly specify policy goals; and (3) accountability is
49. Ibid 192–204.
50. Ibid 198.
51. Ibid 12, 194, 195.
52. Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 9.
53. Lee (n 36) 197–8.
54. See, eg, Mark Fenster, ‘The Opacity of Transparency’ (2006) 91(3) Iowa Law Review 885.
55. Lee (n 36) 193–4.
56. See, eg, Colin Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38, 41.
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‘retrospective’, ie, it is a process that occurs after an agent has carried out the particular tasks
requested by the principal. The existence of some form of hierarchy between a principal and agent
could not be assumed, it was argued, because it was difficult to conclude Comms Alliance is an
agent of Parliament given the underlying enabling legislation does not technically give Comms
Alliance any power to make legally binding rules; ACMA, not Comms Alliance, determines if
rules acquire the force of law. Yet it was also difficult to classify ACMA as an agent of Parliament
given co-regulatory rule-making is a process led by industry. The enabling legislation also does not
provide industry bodies such as Comms Alliance with much (if any) direction about the content of
the rules they may adopt, and any guidance that is provided falls well short of the ‘precise
instructions’ that the principal-agent model presumes. Finally, if goals cannot be set and monitored
in advance, any evaluation process cannot be conducted retrospectively. For these reasons, it was
suggested that accountability should be understood to involve the imposition of a requirement that
industry bodies such as Comms Alliance answer for their decisions or explain themselves to others
throughout the code development process.57
A different approach to responsiveness is taken by Hong and You. Drawing on the work of
Selznick,58 they suggest that responsiveness imposes two inter-related conditions: ‘comprehen-
siveness’ and ‘proactiveness’.59 Both must be satisfied in the contexts of rule-making, compliance
and enforcement, according to Hong and You, if responsiveness is to acquire democratic legiti-
macy. Comprehensiveness is the idea that an institution must be responsive to ‘those upon whom
the institution depends; and to the community whose well-being it affects’.60 Proactiveness is the
need for institutions to ‘reach out’,61 ‘gather voices as diverse as possible’ and ‘seek to respond not
only to expressed but also unexpressed demands [of social needs]’.62 They argue both conditions
are essential components of Selznick’s notion of ‘institutional responsiveness’63—a concept that
also influenced Ayres and Braithwaite’s classic text and, in particular, their concept of tripartism,
which involves empowering public interest groups so (along with regulators and regulatees) they
may participate effectively in the regulatory enforcement process.64
In order to satisfy the conditions of comprehensiveness and proactiveness, according to Hong
and You, responsiveness must be connected to ‘a variety of accountability mechanisms.’65 Recog-
nising that citizens and other parties affected by regulatory decisions do not elect regulators and
regulatees and thus cannot hold them accountable directly, they emphasise the need to link
responsiveness to mechanisms of ‘indirect reciprocity’66—the achievement of the objectives of
57. Lee (n 36) 201–3.
58. See, eg, Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community (University of
California Press, 1992); Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law & Society in Transition (Transaction Publishers,
2001).
59. Hong and You (n 36) 418.
60. Ibid 419, quoting Selznick (n 58) 338.
61. Ibid 422.
62. Ibid 420.
63. For Selznick, an institution (whether public or private) is responsive if it has integrity. However, to have integrity, the
institution must have both autonomy and sensitivity to the wider environment in which it operates (ie, a capacity to
‘outreach to others’ without undermining its autonomy): Selznick (n 58) 334–45. See also Hong and You (n 36)
418–19.
64. See Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29) ch 3.
65. Hong and You (n 36) 420.
66. Ibid.
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accountability via the use of indirect means. To that end, they suggest their concept of ‘overlapping
networked responsiveness’.67 Hong and You never clearly define this term, but, in essence, it
consists of multiple ‘chains’ of ‘networked responsiveness’—the creation or existence of avenues
through which community members and others may appeal to politicians and/or other stakeholders
who are in a position to apply pressure directly on regulators or regulatees to take action or alter
their position in light of community concerns. NGOs, trade unions and media are provided as
examples of stakeholders who could perform this function. Promoting accountability is Hong and
You’s principal focus, but they also point out that overlapping networked responsiveness ‘acts in
the way that . . . deliberation works’, ie, it promotes the contestation of ideas,68 and a ‘transparent
flow of information’ is essential for its success.69
2 Evaluation. The two approaches have some clear differences. Identification of the rationales that
procedural and institutional legitimacy have in common with responsiveness is the basis for the first
approach. The second relies predominantly on Selznick, although it too is informed by republicanism
and its concern for non-domination. Under the second approach, comprehensiveness and proactive-
ness are seen as additional factors that need to be considered along with others already found and
emphasised in the enforcement and compliance literature; Hong and You expressly state it is not their
‘intention that the proposition for democratic regulatory responsiveness replaces the current under-
standing of responsive regulation’.70 The first approach, on the other hand, goes further (at least in
the rule-making context). It sees responsiveness as subsuming the underlying concerns of procedural
and institutional legitimacy with the rationales for the principles of deliberation, impartiality, trans-
parency and accountability emerging as measures that can be used to evaluate if co-regulation and
other forms of industry rule-making are responsive. Notwithstanding their differences, however, both
approaches make explicit the democratic foundations of responsiveness and provide benchmarks
against which public engagement by industry rule-makers could be assessed.
Nevertheless, subject to one modification, the first approach is adopted in this article because
the criteria of the exercise of some independent judgement; the disclosure of a sufficient amount of
relevant information by industry to enable stakeholders and other others to hold it to account;
ensuring industry explains itself to others; and weighing up of alternatives and determination of
what (on balance) meets the needs of all stakeholders more accurately capture the limits and
conditions under which co-regulation and other forms of industry rule-making should operate.
No stakeholders in the process (be they regulatees, regulators and public interest groups) are truly
impartial. Yet if co-regulation and other forms of industry rule-making are to succeed interested
parties must be willing to consider the views of others and that necessitates the exercise of some
degree of independent judgement—a test that an industry body could satisfy, for example, if it
provided evidence that alternative ideas put forward by others were examined, with reasons given
for accepting or rejecting those ideas, and these reasons were tested by other stakeholders in an





71. See, eg, ACMA, Guide to Developing and Varying Telecommunications Codes for Registration (September 2015) 25.
Evidence that rules subsequently adopted by the industry body fail to address identified regulatory problems may also
indicate that an industry body has not exercised independent judgement.
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self-interest, we propose this criterion of responsiveness should be referred to as the requirement of
‘consideration’ to avoid any possible confusion. The test of transparency acknowledges that a
sufficient amount of relevant information by industry and others must be disclosed to enable
stakeholders and others to hold them to account, but equally it recognises that full disclosure to
the public may not always be feasible or desirable, especially in circumstances where the aim is to
encourage industry bodies to engage in full and frank discussion in order to critically analyse and
assess their practices. The definition of accountability is also consistent with Hong and You’s
concept of indirect reciprocity. It reflects the shift from hierarchy to heterarchy that scholars of
responsive regulation72 call for and accepts that the premises on which traditional accountability
mechanisms are based cannot be assumed when strategies of responsive regulation are deployed.
Equally, it opens up the possibility of a range of mechanisms that may serve as functional sub-
stitutes for traditional accountability—mechanisms such as overlapping networked responsive-
ness. Finally, the requirements of consideration, transparency and accountability (as defined) all
promote robust deliberation, which is consistent with law’s central purpose in the ‘decentred’ state
and the way Hong and You envisage accountability should operate when techniques of responsive
regulation are used.
III The Industry Bodies, Their Rule-Making Frameworks and
Mechanisms of Consumer and Citizen Engagement
A The Industry Bodies
Seven industry bodies (all companies limited by guarantee) have drafted codes of practice cur-
rently registered with ACMA or the eSafety Commissioner: Australian Community Television
Alliance (ACTA), Australian Narrowcast Radio Association (ANRA), Australian Subscription
Television and Radio Association (ASTRA), Communications Alliance (Comms Alliance), Com-
munity Broadcasting Association of Australia (CBAA), Commercial Radio Australia (CRA) and
Free TV Australia (Free TV). Comms Alliance represents the sections of industry described
above.73 The other six industry bodies represent different types of broadcasters. ACTA represents
free-to-air community television channels; ANRA, ‘low and high power open narrowcast radio
service [providers]’;74 ASTRA, subscription television and radio broadcasters; CBAA, community
radio broadcasters;75 CRA, commercial radio broadcasters;76 Free TV, free-to-air commercial
television licensees.77
72. See, eg, above nn 29–33.
73. See above Section II(A)(1).
74. Its members provide a range of radio programming from ‘rhythms to ethnic essentials, spiritual support to racing
results’ and include the Big Country Radio network, Adventist Radio Australia and Coolstream Radio: ANRA, ANRA
Members (Web Page) <https://www.anra.org.au/members>.
75. It has more than 300 members which include stations such as Brisbane Youth Radio and Jewish Australian Internet
Radio.
76. CRA has 260 members including 2 GB, Nova and 2Day.
77. Free TV’s members include the Seven Network, the Nine Network, Network Ten, Prime Television, WIN, Southern
Cross Austereo and Imparja Television.
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B Their Rule-Making Frameworks
The boards of ASTRA, CBAA and Free TV initiate code development, review and revision. At
Free TV, the industry body that developed the Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice
referred to in the introduction, a Code Review Group comprised of member representatives under-
takes rule-drafting and related decision-making.78 At CBAA, the secretariat drafts codes; a Code
Advisory Committee provides advice and feedback on them. At ASTRA and ANRA, their boards
or their secretariats draft their codes, and they consult with their members during the process. CRA
said it ‘jointly developed’ its code with ACMA, but the CRA’s internal rule-making process is
likely to be similar to those of ANRA, ASTRA, CBAA and Free TV. The boards of each of these
five industry bodies must approve the final version of any code.79
By contrast, code development within the Comms Alliance, the industry body that developed
the TCP Code mentioned earlier,80 is initiated by Reference Panels or Advisory Groups—two
types of standing bodies, comprised of Comms Alliance members, responsible for a specific area
of industry activity. If approval from the CEO of Comms Alliance is obtained, a working com-
mittee ‘representative’ of interested parties—those ‘who have a stake in or are affected by the
subject matter of the proposed code’81—is established; it is responsible for drafting the code by
way of ‘consensus’. Following publication of the code in draft and consideration of any written
submissions, members of the working committee formally vote to decide if the code should be
approved. If approved, the code is then submitted to Comms Alliance’s board, which decides if the
code should be adopted and registered with ACMA or the eSafety Commissioner.82
As we note in Section IV below, the confidentiality that attaches to the rule-making processes of
industry bodies makes it difficult to obtain specific information about particular instances of rule-
making and the mechanisms industry bodies used to engage with citizens and consumers, although
Lee’s in-depth historical case studies of three consumer codes83 developed by working committees
established under the auspices of Comms Alliance provide some insight.84 There is equally a lack
of information on the extent to which the results of consumer engagement affect the decision-
making of regulators, at the point of registering a draft code of practice. Some indication of the
exchange between the ACMA and Free TV in 2015 in relation to the finalisation of the Commer-
cial Television Industry Code of Practice is provided by published comments from parties. A
representative from Free TV noted that ACMA only registered the code after a number of changes
78. At CBAA, ‘other relevant stakeholders’ are also involved.
79. Several attempts to contact ACTA for information about its procedures were unsuccessful, and it did not participate in a
round table. The inability to contact them may have been due to the June 2018 announcement of the Minister for
Communications that the three remaining community television broadcasters must vacate the terrestrial spectrum by 30
June 2020: see the Hon Mitch Fifield, ‘Community Television Broadcasters Granted Two Year Licence Extension’
(Media Release, 1 June 2018)
80. See above Section I.
81. Communications Alliance Ltd, Operating Manual for the Establishment and Operation of Advisory Groups and the
Development of Codes, Standards and Supplementary Documents (December 2019) s 7.1 (‘Operating Manual’).
82. See ibid ss 6–9.
83. They included Industry Code ACIF C620: Consumer Contracts (2005), Industry Code ACIFC625: Information on
Accessibility Features for Telephone Equipment Code (2005) and Industry Code C637: Mobile Premium Services
(2009).
84. She found that the involvement of consumer representatives on Comms Alliance working committees was a significant
contributor to the legitimacy and responsiveness of the three codes in question, but written submissions made by
members of the public played an insignificant role: Lee (n 36) 237.
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were made to its draft code as a result of both public consultation and consultation with the
ACMA.85 Then in a media release to announce registration of the code, the chair of ACMA made
the following observations:
This code is the product of a robust engagement between the ACMA, the commercial television sector
and its audiences, manifest in submissions made by individual viewers and advocacy groups,’ Mr
Chapman said. ‘The ACMA is precluded by law from registering a code which does not contain
appropriate community safeguards. The ACMA is satisfied that the process of engagement with Free
TV and the wider community has resulted in a new code which, taken as a whole, meets this
requirement.86
C Their Mechanisms of Engagement
To provide a structure to the discussion and analysis that follows, the mechanisms of engagement
used by the seven industry bodies have been classified into four forms of consumer and citizen
engagement: data collection, public communication, public input and public dialogue.87 Each
category broadly reflects the ‘flow of information’88 or the extent of dialogue between an industry
body and consumers or citizens that likely occurs as a result of the engagement mechanism.89
Throughout the discussion, four functions of rule-making that industry bodies perform when
deploying the engagement mechanisms are highlighted. These four functions are: fact-finding
(which involves an industry body identifying, understanding and describing industry and con-
sumer/citizen practices and the environments in which they take place); identifying and describing
regulatory issues (which involves an industry body identifying, understanding and evaluating the
aspects of the business practices of its members that raise regulatory concerns); formulating
regulatory approaches and rules;90 and monitoring and assessing operation of rules.91
The industry bodies considered in this article have used one or more of 13 different mechanisms
of consumer and citizen engagement92 and have often used one mechanism in conjunction with
one or more of the others.
85. Clare O’Neil, ‘New Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice’ (2016) 35(1) Communications Law Bulletin 1, 2.
86. ACMA (n 28).
87. In this article, references to ‘public’ in public communication, public input and public dialogue include citizens and
consumers.
88. Gene Rowe and Lynn J Frewer, ‘A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms’ (2005) 30(2) Science, Technology &
Human Values 251, 254–5.
89. While we have drawn heavily on the classification approach developed by Rowe and Frewer (n 87), we elected to
create a fourth category of public engagement mechanisms—data collection—because of the importance of
information about consumer and citizen experiences that industry bodies usually, but not exclusively, acquire from
third parties, such as the Telecommunications Industry Ombud and research conducted by ACMA.
90. The term ‘rules’ is adopted here because in some instances it may be preferable for an industry body to adopt something
other than a code such as an industry guideline.
91. The functions are a reflection of the different stages in the regulatory process and the various ‘duties’ of rule-makers.
On the importance of stages in the regulatory process, see, eg, Julia Black, ‘Involving Consumers in Securities
Regulation’ (Taskforce to Modernize Securities Regulation, 2006) 19–21. On the duties of legislators, see Luc J
Wintgens, Legisprudence: Practical Reasons in Legislation (Ashgate Publishing, 2012) 294–304.
92. Comms Alliance has used certain other consumer and public engagement mechanisms outside of its rule-making
activities that may have indirectly influenced its rule-making activities. For example, until 2008–09, Comms Alliance
allowed consumer and/or public interest organisations to become members of its organisation.
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All mechanisms have been adopted voluntarily unless otherwise noted.
1 Data Collection. Six of the seven industry bodies (ANRA, ASTRA, Comms Alliance, CBAA,
CRA and Free TV) engage in some form of data collection—the acquisition and collation of pre-
existing data about industry practices related to the subject of a potential rule or an existing rule, or
about some aspect of the operation of the rule.
Complaints data—data about complaints made by consumers, viewers and listeners to members
of an industry body, or a regulatory body, such as ACMA, the eSafety Commissioner or the
Telecommunications Industry Ombud (TIO), which provides the data to the relevant industry
body—are the second most commonly used engagement mechanism. However, review of research
into the experience of listeners, viewers and others carried out by, or on behalf of, a regulatory
body or law reform commission (review of research) is also used. During the Industry Round
Table, representatives from four media-related industry bodies that are the subject of this article
said audience feedback often provided ‘instant response[s]’ about programming content via Mes-
senger, Facebook and other means,93 but no one provided an example of how audience responses
to programs might feed into code review activities, as distinct from the daily activities of an
audience relations or audience analysis team.
Complaints data and review of research are used primarily in the initial stages of fact-finding,
the first rule-making function. However, they are also used by industry bodies in connection with
the fourth function of rule-making, monitoring and assessing the operation of rules (once adopted).
Minimal data collection appears to occur in connection with the second and third functions of
rule-making (identifying and describing issues and then formulating regulatory approaches and
code rules for the issues identified). Industry bodies may use data collected during fact-finding
when performing these other functions. However, it is also likely that, when performing these other
functions, the more specific information obtained from the use of public input and dialogue
mechanisms (considered below) supplants the data collected in fact-finding and when monitoring
and assessing the operation of rules.
2 Public Communication. Mechanisms of public communication—the provision of information
about a rule-making initiative to consumers or citizens—are not used by any industry body
when conducting fact-finding or monitoring or assessing the operation of rules. Only Comms
Alliance has sought to convey information to the public while identifying and describing
issues: it has on occasion published issue papers relating to the development of ‘consumer
codes’ on its website.94 By contrast, all seven industry bodies have used one of two mechan-
isms of public communication when formulating regulatory approaches and rules: dissemina-
tion of information by publication on their websites, social media channels and/or other
outlets such as newspapers and radio stations, and holding meetings with consumer and public
interest organisations to explain and answer questions about proposed codes following their
publication in draft.
All seven industry bodies publish their draft rules. As noted above, the legislative frameworks
authorising co-regulatory rule-making in the online and telecommunications sectors mandate that
93. Statement by a representative from an organisation whose name was withheld (Industry Round Table, 10 May 2019).
94. Consumer codes, one of three types of codes Comms Alliance has adopted, generally relate to telecommunications
goods and services that are delivered to residential and small businesses customers and grant some form of rights or
protections to them.
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ACMA or the eSafety Commissioner, before registering a code, must be satisfied that the industry
body concerned has published a draft of it. In contrast, Part 9 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992
(Cth), applicable to ACTA, ANRA, ASTRA, CBAA, CRA and Free TV, does not explicitly
require publication of a draft code: it states only that ACMA must be satisfied that ‘members of
the public have been given an adequate opportunity to comment on the code’. The meaning of an
‘adequate opportunity to comment on the code’ is determined by relevant industry bodies in
conjunction with ACMA on a code-by-code and case-by-case basis. In practice, however, ACMA
has always required the relevant industry body to publish its codes in draft in order to satisfy this
obligation.95
Other information published when formulating regulatory approaches and rules includes notices
about draft codes (ASTRA, Comms Alliance, CRA, Free TV); press releases (ASTRA, CRA, Free
TV); explanatory guides, discussion papers and overviews of principal proposed changes (Comms
Alliance, CRA, Free TV); written submissions received during public consultation (Comms Alli-
ance, CRA, Free TV96); and the names of the individuals who serve on code working committees
(Comms Alliance).
With few exceptions, copies of the information that the seven industry bodies conveyed to
consumers and citizens when engaged in public communication could not be located, making
further analysis difficult.
In addition to dissemination of information by publication, CBAA and Free TV have met with
consumer and citizen interest organisations to explain, and answer questions about, draft codes
after they have been published.
3 Public Input
(a) Mechanisms Deployed. The seven industry bodies have used seven different mechanisms of
public input, which consists of opportunities for consumers and citizens to respond to invitations
issued by an industry body to supply information to it.97
Overwhelmingly, the most commonly used engagement mechanism is the provision of an
opportunity to make a written submission. However, advisory committees,98 focus groups, meet-
ings with consumer/citizen interest organisations, and employees of industry bodies or persons
engaging in code development on their behalf (collectively referred to below as meetings),99 phone
submissions, round tables and surveys have been deployed as well.
95. Interview with ACMA employees (names withheld) (Karen Lee and Derek Wilding, by phone, 22 November 2018).
During the interview, we were also told that ACMA’s approach to satisfying this requirement was informed by the six
general principles of consultation outlined in ACMA, Effective Consultation: The ACMA’s Guide to Making a
Submission (November 2015), but this document no longer appears on ACMA’s website.
96. Since 2014, subject to some exceptions, Comms Alliance is required to publish on its website any submissions made
concerning a draft code developed under Part 6 of the TA. See TA (n 3) s 119B. A similar requirement is not imposed on
industry bodies that develop codes in accordance with Part 9 and Schedules 5 and 7 of the BSA (n 2) or Part 4 of the IGA
(n 5), but CRA and Free TV have in recent years published the written submissions they receive.
97. This category is the same as Rowe and Frewer’s category of ‘public consultation’. Its name has been changed because
the one-way nature of information flow from consumers or the public to the industry body is better captured by the term
‘input’ rather than ‘consultation’.
98. These are committees comprised exclusively of consumer and/or public stakeholder representatives who provide
advice about rule development to the industry body or its working committees.
99. Meetings may be requested by employees of the industry body, the members of its rule-making committee or consumer
and public interest organisations.
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When formulating regulatory approaches and rules, each of the seven industry bodies has
afforded the public an opportunity to make written submissions on draft codes. This is because
ACMA100 has insisted upon it in order to satisfy itself that the requirements of public consultation
in each of the applicable statutory frameworks have been met.101 However, Comms Alliance has
also solicited written submissions in response to issue papers relating to the development of
consumer codes (ie, when identifying and describing issues).
The other six public input mechanisms have been used by Comms Alliance and CBAA, but
neither body has used all of them. Comms Alliance has used advisory committees (until 2009),
focus groups, meetings and surveys. CBAA has used focus groups, round tables, meetings and
phone submissions. Comms Alliance and CBAA have used these mechanisms when formulating
regulatory approaches and rules. CBAA does not appear to have used any of the six public input
mechanisms during issue identification or when monitoring or assessing the operation of code
rules. However, Comms Alliance has held meetings with, or otherwise sought comment from, the
Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN)—the peak organisation repre-
senting communications consumers in Australia—during issue identification and when monitoring
and assessing the operation of consumer codes such as the TCP Code and other codes102 that
Comms Alliance believes have an effect on consumers. In addition to these mechanisms, the CEOs
of Comms Alliance and ACCAN meet quarterly, and ACCAN and Comms Alliance’s Industry
Consumer Advisory Group, responsible for ‘represent[ing] and advanc[ing] the interests of CA
[Communication Alliance] members involved in the delivery of services to end users’,103 meet
annually. ACCAN’s views on the appropriateness of rules may be discussed during these meetings.
(b) Procedural Aspects of Written Submissions. There are a number of procedural matters involving
written submissions. Below we briefly explain the practices of the seven industry bodies in relation
to three such matters because they appear to contribute (at least in part) to the barriers to partic-
ipation identified and discussed in Section IV.
(i) Means of Publicising Opportunity to Make Submissions. ASTRA, CBAA, CRA, Comms
Alliance and Free TV have used various means to publicise the opportunity to make written
submissions and, in many instances, they have used multiple publicity mechanisms concurrently.
All have advertised opportunities to make written submissions on their websites, via social media
channels and other outlets, including major newspapers such as The Australian and The Sydney
Morning Herald, and in press releases. Other mechanisms used by some industry bodies have
100. The eSafety Commissioner acquired the power to register codes in accordance with Part 5 of Schedule 5 and Part 4 of
Schedule 7 of the BSA (n 2) in 2015 following the enactment of the Enhancing Online Safety for Children
(Consequential Amendments) Act 2015 (Cth). Until then, ACMA was responsible for registering codes pursuant to
the two schedules of the BSA. The eSafety Commissioner has not registered a code since it acquired this power.
101. As mentioned in the introduction, all applicable legislation requires the relevant regulator, before registering a code,
to be satisfied that ‘members of the public have been given an adequate opportunity to comment on the code’ or that
industry bodies have invited members of the public to make submissions within a specified period. However, the
legislation does not refer specifically to written submissions.
102. They include network and operations codes. Network codes deal with technical matters. Operations codes govern
operational relationships between members of the telecommunications industry. ACIF, Guideline: Development of
Telecommunications Industry Operations Codes (March 1998) 5–6. Until 2006, Comms Alliance was known as the
Australian Communications Industry Forum (ACIF).
103. Communications Alliance Ltd, Industry Consumer Advisory Group: Terms of Reference 1 <https://www.
commsalliance.com.au/Activities/committees-and-groups/ICAG>.
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included: the monthly subscriber magazines of their members (ASTRA); email (ASTRA, Comms
Alliance); newsletters (Comms Alliance); community service announcements on television (Free
TV when it was known as the Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations (FACTS));
and radio (CBAA).104
(ii) Acknowledgement of Written Submissions. None of the seven bodies requires its rule-
makers105 to acknowledge receipt of, and/or to provide comments in response to, submissions
made by individuals and other organisations. Nevertheless, as a matter of practice, when devel-
oping codes, Comms Alliance has provided a response to consumer organisations and private
individuals who submit comments.
(iii) Requirements When Accepting or Rejecting Public Comments. Comms Alliance is the only
industry body that requires ‘reasons for not incorporating feedback’ in an amended draft code to be
recorded in meeting minutes, and ‘advised to the author of the feedback in writing (unless the
author is a member of the Working Committee and has not requested such advice)’.106
4. Public Dialogue. Two of the seven industry bodies (Comms Alliance and CBAA) have employed
mechanisms of public dialogue—mechanisms that facilitate the simultaneous exchange of infor-
mation, ideas and proposals as well as debate and negotiation between consumers or citizens, and
an industry body.107
Both CBBA and Comms Alliance have invited and allowed consumer/citizen interest orga-
nisations to serve on their code advisory and working committees. At CBAA, representatives
from stakeholders such as First Nations Media Australia, Christian Media and Arts Australia
have been appointed to advisory committees which have provided code-related advice and
feedback to the CBAA secretariat, which is responsible for drafting codes. At Comms Alliance,
representatives from participating consumer/citizen interest organisations have been appointed
to working committees responsible for drafting consumer codes and other codes that Comms
Alliance believes have an effect on consumers. Codes are drafted by consensus, and as working
committee members, consumer/citizen interest organisations are entitled to vote if codes should
be approved and submitted to the Comms Alliance board, which decides if they should be
submitted for registration.108 Comms Alliance has appointed a number of different consumer
organisations and other entities such as the police to relevant code working committees. How-
ever, ACCAN is the most significant. Since its creation in July 2009, it has been involved with all
consumer code working committees and most working committees developing other codes with
an effect on consumers.
In addition to working committee participation, Comms Alliance relies ‘heavily’109 on ACCAN
to solicit the views of its members about draft consumer codes and related issues. ACCAN
members are free to make written submissions directly to Comms Alliance. However, ACCAN
104. Email from CBAA employee to Derek Wilding and Karen Lee, 30 May 2019.
105. Codes are drafted by working committees which may include non-industry members (eg, Comms Alliance), code
review groups comprised of member representatives (eg, Free TV) and industry body secretariats (eg, ANRA). Some
secretariats are advised by code advisory committees (eg, CBAA).
106. Operating Manual (n 80) s 11.4(a).
107. This category of mechanism is the same as Rowe and Frewer’s category of the same name. See Rowe and Frewer (n
87) 255–6.
108. For more on Comms Alliance’s rule-making framework, see Operating Manual (n 80).
109. Statement by a Comms Alliance representative (Industry Round Table, 10 May 2019).
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often collates feedback from its 100 plus members—feedback which is fed into Comms Alliance
working committees by way of a single written submission or via ACCAN representatives during
working committee discussions.110 ACCAN determines how best to consult with its members, and
the methods used vary depending on the circumstances. For example, during the informal ‘chapter
by chapter’ review of the TCP Code initiated by the relevant Comms Alliance working committee
in 2018,111 ACCAN sent an email to its members for whom the code was most relevant. The email
included a brief explanation of each chapter of the TCP Code, a link to the code, ACCAN’s ‘top
concerns’ and its suggestions as to how each chapter should be amended; and a request to comment
on ACCAN’s suggestions and provide any additional feedback. If a member did not reply to the
initial email, follow-up calls were made.
Both public dialogue mechanisms are deployed when industry bodies formulate and evaluate
approaches and alternatives. Thus, they are used after fact-finding occurs and when issues have
already been identified and described.
IV Assessment of Industry Engagement Mechanisms
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that several factors contribute to responsiveness in industry
rule-making. While important, mechanisms of consumer and citizen engagement (used individu-
ally or collectively) are just some of the factors that are likely to contribute to responsiveness.
Other elements, including the ability (and willingness) of regulators to wield ‘big sticks’112 or
impose ‘penalty defaults’,113 the involvement of Ministers and vertical supply chains, have also
been shown to contribute to the responsiveness of co-regulatory rule-making.114 In addition, it
must be acknowledged that the data collected does not allow for easy evaluation of all facets of
responsiveness. Much more specific information about particular instances of rule-making and the
mechanisms industry bodies used to engage with citizens and consumers—information that is
difficult to obtain because the rule-making processes of industry bodies are confidential—is
needed before each element of responsiveness could be definitively applied. Any assessment of
consideration, in particular, is difficult without this information, as it is tough to determine if the
industry bodies seriously considered or reflected on the concerns and ideas conveyed to them
through any of the identified forms of engagement. However, the data collected enables some
assessment of the mechanisms of consumer and citizen engagement industry bodies have deployed
because certain mechanisms are inherently much more likely than others to promote the achieve-
ment of responsiveness.
If, as suggested, responsiveness is the appropriate benchmark against which consumer and
citizen engagement practices should be evaluated, then it would appear that the current consumer
and citizen engagement practices of several industry bodies are not adequately facilitating
110. This mechanism has been placed in the category of public dialogue because ACCAN frequently provides the feedback
in the course of discussion with industry members of Comms Alliance working committees.
111. Telecommunications Consumer Protections Code (C628:2015 (incorporating variation no 1 2016)) was the edition of
the TCP Code subject to this review.
112. Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29) ch 4.
113. See, eg, Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist
Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14(3) European Law Journal 271, 308.
114. Lee (n 36) 167–206, 226–37.
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deliberation, transparency, consideration115 and accountability (as defined). This is so, notwith-
standing the awareness, demonstrated during the Industry and Regulator Round Tables, many
industry and regulatory bodies have of the difficulty of engaging consumers, citizens and related
organisations, and the deployment, by some industry bodies (often with the encouragement of
regulators), of more than one mechanism of engagement to that end.
As the analysis in Section III(C) highlighted, there is limited adoption of the fourth form of
consumer and citizen engagement, namely public dialogue. The mechanisms applicable to this
form of engagement promote discussion between consumers and citizens, regulators, and industry
bodies, or require industry bodies and regulators to explain and defend their positions to others.
Most industry bodies are heavily reliant on complaints data when engaged in data collection during
fact-finding and monitoring and assessing the operation of rules, and on written submissions when
seeking public input during the formulation of regulatory approaches and rules. While both
mechanisms may yield important information to the rule-making process, neither promotes the
robust exchange of ideas between all interested parties that is the hallmark of responsiveness.
Moreover, when public dialogue mechanisms are deployed, they are deployed relatively late in the
rule-making process, ie, after fact-finding and regulatory issues are identified and described. Some
industry bodies have used different public input mechanisms to identify and describe issues.
However, use of these mechanisms is not the norm, and no industry body is using mechanisms
of public dialogue to assist with issue identification and description. Even Comms Alliance, which
appoints consumer representatives to its working committees developing consumer codes and
other codes with an effect on consumers, does not appear to routinely involve representatives in
dialogue when framing the issues codes are intended to address. Only a few examples of the
information industry bodies convey during public communication could be found,116 but on the
basis of the information reviewed, there is significant doubt that they are disclosing the information
consumers, citizens and related organisations need in order to play a meaningful role (along with
regulators) in holding industry to account. While certain documentation may explain the substance
of rules and/or highlight amendments made to them, rationales for new or revised rules are not
provided. Alternatives that may have been considered, but rejected, are not described or explained.
The information gathered about industry’s engagement practices raises a number of specific
questions and concerns. However, in the discussion that follows, the focus is primarily on the
difficulties of relying on written submissions and complaints data. Written submissions and com-
plaints data are the focal point for several reasons. First, they are the most commonly used
engagement mechanisms, and in the case of written submissions, their use has been insisted upon
by ACMA in order to satisfy the code registration criteria relating to public consultation. Second,
there was evidence that few consumers, citizens and organisations representing their interests make
written submissions, despite industry efforts (and increasingly regulator efforts),117 to publicise
opportunities to make them. For example, CRA now receives fewer than 10 submissions in
115. As noted above, conclusions concerning consideration are difficult to make because of the lack of data.
116. They included three newspaper advertisements, placed by Comms Alliance, FACTS and CRA, soliciting public
comment on draft codes; a public comment explanatory statement, published by Comms Alliance, that
accompanied a draft TCP Code; and the ‘consultation package’ Free TV issued in November 2018 in relation to
the draft code provisions banning gambling advertising in live sport.
117. In the last few years, ACMA has supported the publicity efforts of Comms Alliance, CRA, Free TV and other industry
bodies by issuing press releases about, and advertising, opportunities to make written submissions on draft codes on its
website and social media channels.
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response to draft codes published during its code review process.118 Similarly, ASTRA’s public
consultation on the Codes of Practice for Subscription Narrowcast Radio and Subscription Broad-
cast and Narrowcast Television, registered by ACMA on 7 November 2013, resulted in just 18
submissions from consumer organisations and members of the public.119 Only Free TV reported it
received a sizeable number of written submissions from the public on draft codes, which was due in
part to concerted campaigns by consumer organisations on issues such as gambling and alcohol
advertising. Third, round table participants’ perceptions of the reliability of complaints data as a
mechanism of public engagement differed significantly depending on the complaints handling
body involved. For example, subject to some qualifications,120 complaints data gathered by the
TIO was seen as valuable because it receives a large number of complaints annually.121 By contrast
complaints data collected by ACMA about traditional broadcasters was seen as less useful, because
it receives only a small number of code-related complaints each year.122 Fourth, employing an
approach developed by Farina et al in the US administrative rule-making context, the analysis
highlights a range of stakeholders that do not participate in co-regulatory rule-making and the
existence of significant barriers to their participation—barriers that suggest both mechanisms have
significant limitations.
Writing in the context of the Obama administration’s ‘Open Government Plan’ initiative, which
was intended (among other things) to increase, through the use of Web 2.0 technology, citizen
participation and the number of written submissions citizens make during public consultation on
draft administrative rules,123 Farina, Newhart and Heidt reject the position that all information and
other preferences expressed by consumers and citizens are equally valuable to administrative rule-
makers.124 They argue, instead, that ‘the value of participatory inputs [such as written submissions]
must be gauged [not by the number of submissions received but] by the kind of decisional process
we expect [an] . . . agency to engage in’.125 In their view, administrative rule-makers are expected
to engage in reasoned decision-making, weigh competing interests and values and give reasons for
their decisions. Therefore, if one is seeking to increase public participation, administrative
resources and energy should be directed to encouraging submissions from ‘missing stake-
holders’—stakeholders such as small businesses, citizens and individual consumers who have not
traditionally participated in public consultation, but are directly affected by policy decisions and
118. Karen Lee and Derek Wilding, Industry Bodies and Schemes in the Communications Sector: Rule-Making
Frameworks and Consumer and Citizen Engagement (Supplementary Report, November 2019) 42.
119. ACMA, ‘Improved Community Safeguards in Codes for Subscription Television and Radio Industry’ (Media Release
84/2-13, 7 November 2013).
120. For example, the ACCAN representative emphasised that the TIO data ‘can provide a false picture of what’s really
happening’ because it reflects the number of ‘escalated’ complaints—complaints that individuals have been unable to
resolve with their telecommunications providers—and not the total number of complaints made to the industry.
121. In 2018–19, the TIO received a total of 132,387 complaints, a figure that was 21.1 per cent lower than in 2017–18:
TIO, Annual Report 2018–19 (Report, 25 September 2019) 13.
122. In 2018–19, ACMA conducted 21 investigations in response to complaints about traditional broadcasters. See ACMA
and Office of the eSafety Commissioner, Annual Reports 2018–19 (Report, 15 October 2019) 108–120. Each
investigation was triggered by at least one complaint made to ACMA, but we could not determine the total
number of complaints received by ACMA.
123. Cynthia R Farina, Mary J Newhart and Josiah Heidt, ‘Rulemaking vs Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public
Participation That Counts’ (2012) 2 Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law 123, 128–9.
124. See, eg, Nina Mendelson, ‘Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of Email’ (2011) 79 George Washington Law
Review 1343.
125. Farina, Newhart and Heidt (n 122) 140–1 (emphasis in original).
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can contribute ‘situated knowledge’—‘information [known by missing stakeholders] about
impacts, problems, enforceability, contributory causes, [and] unintended consequences’ of those
policy decisions.126 Moreover, resources and energy should be directed to identifying measures
needed to overcome four principal barriers to participation faced by these stakeholders: a lack of
general or specific awareness that proposed rules may affect them and/or that they can participate;
‘information overload’; ‘low participation literacy’; and ‘motivational barriers’.127 Information
overload means information provided by rule-makers is incomprehensible, uses jargon or is oth-
erwise not presented in a way that ordinary people can understand or want to read.128 Low
participation literacy means missing stakeholders are unfamiliar with how to participate in the
quasi-deliberative processes of rule-making. It needs to be explained to them that merely expres-
sing support for or against a specific result is not sufficient in order to participate effectively in the
process. They must be encouraged, for example, to provide information, give reasons and consider
alternative arguments.129 Motivational barriers include obstacles such as competing demands for
their time and attention, distrust of rule-makers and cynicism about the likely effect public con-
sultation will have on the final outcomes.130
Co-regulatory rule-making in Australia is different from the US administrative context in which
Farina et al have observed written submissions. Despite this, their approach was used to interrogate
consumer and public engagement in co-regulatory rule-making and formulate questions posed to
round table participants for several reasons. First, their view that not all written submissions are of
equal value is implicit in guidance on public consultation provided by the Australian government
to its departments and agencies.131 Thus, it accords with the Australian consultative approach.
Second, for the reasons explained in Section II above, although very different entities, industry
rule-makers are expected to engage in a similar deliberative decision-making process as their
administrative counterparts, ie, one that involves reasoned decision-making, assessment of com-
peting interests and values and the giving of reasons. Third, Farina et al’s approach encourages
serious evaluation of the stakeholders who are missing from industry consultation exercises and the
measures that could be taken to address the barriers to participation they face. Fourth, their
approach is pragmatic. It recognises that resources for written submissions (and other forms of
public engagement) are not unlimited; they should be strategically deployed where they are ‘most
likely to make a significant contribution to policymaking’.132
Below the different barriers to making written submissions and filing complaints that confront
consumers and citizens in the context of co-regulatory rule-making are highlighted. Research that
suggests these barriers may be overcome by adopting certain measures is then briefly considered.
Next, it will be argued that the cost of overcoming these barriers is significant and, even if all were
overcome, continued reliance on written submissions and complaints data is unlikely to achieve
responsiveness. It will be suggested that if the goal of responsiveness is to be advanced, the onus of
initiating and sustaining engagement during code development and the cost of that engagement
126. Ibid 148 (emphasis omitted).




131. See, eg, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Best Practice Consultation Guidance Note (March 2020)
7–9.
132. Farina et al, ‘Democratic Deliberation in the Wild’ (n 23) 1567.
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should shift from consumers and citizens to industry. Industry bodies should be required to engage
comprehensively with the public, using a range of alternative engagement mechanisms, such as
surveys, focus groups and round tables, to be specified by the relevant regulator in a legislative
instrument, instead of, or in conjunction with, written submissions and complaints data. Moreover,
industry bodies should be required to demonstrate that one or more bodies or associations that
represent the interests of consumers or citizens has been appointed to, and served on, the working
committees or industry advisory bodies they convene for the purposes of code development.
A Written Submissions
Consumer Round Table participants identified a number of stakeholders who could enhance
industry rule-making but are not submitting written comments when industry bodies offer them
that opportunity. These missing stakeholders included: young people, women escaping domestic
violence, homeless individuals, individuals from regional, rural and other remote communities,
people who do not speak English and people with disabilities. Small businesses were also iden-
tified as a particularly difficult group to engage. As one representative stated:
they’re spread so thin . . . there are huge demands, because everybody wants to talk to small busi-
ness . . . we try to engage with industry associations, because they have more time . . . but typically even
the industry associations are run by small business people who are . . . trying to juggle the association
and also run their business[es].133
Industry and regulatory participants were not specifically asked to identify stakeholders who
were missing from industry engagement processes, but both sets of participants accepted that some
stakeholders, including those who are not vulnerable, are missing. The representative from Comms
Alliance stated that her organisation ‘rarely get[s] interactions with or feedback from the average
consumer’. The comments made by several representatives from other industry and regulatory
bodies also indicated industry bodies have not managed to obtain feedback from ‘a broader and
more diverse audience’.
Consumer Round Table participants also drew attention to barriers to participation—barriers
with clear parallels to those identified by Farina et al that made it difficult for individual citizens
and consumers as well as organisations established to advocate on their behalf to participate in
code development.
One such barrier that affected consumer organisations was ‘submission fatigue’,134 which
ACCAN later suggested was closely connected to the limited resources available to consumer
organisations. In its experience, the costs of preparing written submissions were disproportionately
higher for small consumer organisations (than they are for larger industry organisations) relative to
the benefit they obtain from making written submissions, and it is these costs that contribute to
submission fatigue. However, Consumer Round Table participants also attributed submission
fatigue to repeated industry requests for the same or similar information and the failure to provide
accessible or ‘effective’ information.135 They reported spending a significant amount of time
setting out accessible summaries of proposed rules and the background information needed to
133. Statement by an ACCAN representative (Consumer Round Table, 9 May 2019).
134. Statement by a representative from an organisation whose name was withheld (Consumer Round Table, 9 May 2019).
135. Ibid.
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evaluate them—information required before they can begin to consult with their members and
other stakeholders.
Motivational barriers to participation mentioned by consumer representatives included: the lack
of ‘trust that if you’re going to put time into doing a submission . . . that anything is going to come
out of it’136 and the absence of feedback from industry bodies following submission of written
comments. Several consumer representatives also agreed with this statement made by a colleague:
the main downfall of written submissions is that often you get the impression that it’s already a bit of a
done deal, because something’s already been drafted by people who think they know what we need
and . . . you’re not always convinced that a written submission is going to be heard . . . 137
Consumer Round Table participants spoke about the following barriers as well:
 The lack of time that individuals and organisations have to engage with the various issues.
As one stated, ‘I think it’s about time and it’s about priorities’. She explained, ‘We’re an
entirely voluntary organisation and there’s just a limit to how much we can move—we’re all
trying to run businesses as well, and make a living, and there’s a point where you just have
to draw the line . . . ’138
 The cost of participation and industry’s failure to compensate them for their time.139
 The use of technical or complex language. The Country Women’s Australia representative
stated, ‘They [industry bodies] use language that the average person or disadvantaged
people might not necessarily understand . . . [I]t’s about using basic language and trying
to deliver the message from the point of view of somebody who actually has a limited
knowledge of the subject or what you’re trying to deliver.’
 Industry’s failure to engage with consumers, citizens and related organisations early on in
the rule-making process, which contributed to the impression that written submissions were
a ‘done deal’.
Although not specifically mentioned by any round table participant, missing stakeholders are also
likely to lack awareness about the effect draft rules proposed by industry bodies may have on them
and/or their entitlement to participate. Invitations to make written submissions are published on the
websites of industry bodies, but many individual consumers and citizens are unlikely to look at
them because they do not know who these industry bodies are. Some industry bodies place
advertisements in major newspapers and other fora inviting written submissions on their draft
codes (at some considerable expense),140 but they may not be seen by missing stakeholders. One
consumer representative, who suggested advertisements were not being seen by senior citizens,




139. Payment of travel costs was not raised as a concern by Consumer Round Table participants as industry bodies such as
Comms Alliance have typically paid for such costs for consumer organisations where travel to code-related meetings
was necessary.
140. For example, the Free TV representative observed that placing newspaper advertisements inviting written
submissions on its draft code cost approximately $20,000.
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such as The Senior], not just, do what you’ve been doing for the last 20, 30 years, and going to
[The] Sydney Morning Herald, or something like that’.141
B Complaints Data
Obstacles similar to those raised in the context of written submissions discourage the filing or
escalation of complaints, or at least make it harder for aggrieved individuals to make and/or
continue to pursue their complaints.
First, as a TIO representative stated, individuals must be able to identify the body to which they
should complain and/or escalate a complaint, a process which is not straightforward. As high-
lighted below, the bodies to whom they may complain and the procedures they must follow differ.
The complexity gives rise to a significant participation barrier.
If consumers and citizens wish to make complaints about a traditional broadcaster subject to
codes promulgated by ACTA, ANRA, ASTRA, CBAA, CRA and Free TV, they must complain in
the first instance to the specific broadcaster concerned. However, if they receive no response
within 60 days of making a complaint or are dissatisfied with the response they receive, they may
refer the complaint to ACMA.142
On the other hand, if consumers and citizens wish to complain about entities subject to codes
that are the responsibility of Comms Alliance, the body they may complain to, and the procedures
they must follow, vary depending on the relevant code and/or the Act under which it is registered.
If their complaints relate to codes, such as the TCP Code, that are registered under Part 6 of the
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) (‘Part 6 codes’) and have conferred power on the TIO to
resolve complaints,143 they must first attempt to resolve their complaints with the relevant tele-
communications provider.144 If their complaints are not satisfactorily resolved, they may then
complain to the TIO. However, complaints relating to entities subject to Part 6 codes that do not
confer power on the TIO must be referred to ACMA.145 Complaints relating to entities subject to
the Interactive Gambling Industry Code,146 registered under s 38 of the Internet Gambling Act
2001 (Cth), may be made to ACMA.147 Complaints relating to the Codes for Industry Co-
Regulation in Areas of Internet and Mobile Content,148 registered under Schedule 5 of the Broad-
casting Services Act 1992 (Cth)149 and applicable to internet service providers, and the Content
Services Code,150 registered under Schedule 7 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth)151 and
141. Statement by a representative from an organisation whose name was withheld (Consumer Round Table, 9 May 2019).
142. BSA (n 2) s 148.
143. At the time of writing, nine Part 6 codes have conferred powers on the TIO. Section 114(1) of the TA (n 3) stipulates
the TIO must consent to the conferral of such powers.
144. All carriage service providers who supply the following services are required under statute to participate in the TIO’s
complaints resolution scheme: standard telephone services used by residential and small business customers, public
mobile telecommunications services and carriage services that enable end-users to access the internet. See
Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 127–8(1).
145. See TA (n 3) ss 508–9.
146. Internet Industry Association, Interactive Gambling Industry Code: A Code for Industry Co-regulation in the Area of
Internet Gambling Content (December 2001).
147. IGA (n 5) s 17.
148. Internet Industry Association, Codes for Industry Co-Regulation in Areas of Internet and Mobile Content (May 2005).
149. BSA (n 2) sch 5 pt 5 cl 62.
150. Internet Industry Association, Content Services Code (10 July 2008).
151. BSA (n 2) sch 7 pt 4 cl 85.
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applicable to sections of the content industry, may be made to various entities designated in the two
codes or the eSafety Commissioner.152 These arrangements are in addition to those supporting
complaints about advertising and about print and online news media under various self-regulatory
schemes.153
In addition to needing to know to whom they can complain, Consumer Round Table participants
said complainants need to ‘feel empowered enough . . . to actually pick up the phone or send . . . an
email’. Complainants must also ‘have the time, and know the skills’ to complain, and, in the case
of TIO complainants, be ‘resilient enough to take it all the way to the TIO.’ One consumer
representative added that complaints processes were ‘totally skewed towards the white, middle-
class’—a statement consistent with the empirical findings of academics who have carried out
research into the socio-economic demographics of individuals who made complaints to public-
and private-sector ombuds schemes in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.154
Hertogh, who conducted research in Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, found that
‘most complainants are highly educated, white-collared, and politically interested men with a
fairly high level of trust in law and the justice system’.155 A Regulator Round Table repre-
sentative said that the data TIO records156 provides indicators about the people who participate
in the scheme and ‘a reasonably accurate reflection of who is missing’, thus serving to high-
light when additional engagement mechanisms are needed to obtain information from those
‘voices’.157 However, the TIO does not record matters such as gender, Indigeneity or socio-
economic status of complainants,158 and no academic studies have been conducted on the
profiles of complainants to the TIO, ACMA or the eSafety Commissioner. Most scholars and
practitioners working in the complaints arena assume ‘vulnerable consumers are less likely to
complain’.159
C Overcoming Participation Barriers
Interdisciplinary research, also conducted by Farina et al in the context of administrative rule-
making, demonstrated that the use of Web 2.0 technologies could increase the number of missing
152. See BSA (n 2) sch 5 pt 4 div 1 cl 23, sch 7 pt 3 div 1 cl 38(2).
153. Karen Lee and Derek Wilding, Responsive Engagement: Involving Consumers and Citizens in Communications
Industry Rule-Making (Report, November 2019) 25.
154. See, eg, Steven Van Roosbroek and Steven Van de Walle, ‘The Relationship between Ombuds, Government and
Citizens: A Survey Analysis’ (2008) 24(3) Negotiation Journal 287; Marc Hertogh, ‘Why the Ombuds Does Not
Promote Public Trust in Government: Lessons from the Low Countries’ (2013) 35(2) Journal of Social Welfare and
Family Law 245, 253; Naomi Creutzfeldt, ‘What Do We Expect from an Ombuds? Narratives of Everyday
Engagement with the Informal Justice System in Germany and the UK’ (2016) 12(4) International Journal of Law
in Context 437, 442.
155. Hertogh (n 153) 246.
156. This information includes their geographic location (ie, the state or territory in which they live and whether they reside
in major cities, regional and remote areas) and if they are residential, small business or not-for-profit consumers.
157. Statement by an ACMA representative (Regulator Round Table, 9 May 2019). His opinion does not necessarily
represent ACMA’s view.
158. Conversation with a TIO representative who attended the Regulator Round Table (Karen Lee, by phone, 18 March
2020).
159. Carol Brennan et al, ‘Consumer Vulnerability and Complaint Handling: Challenges, Opportunities and Dispute
System Design’ (2017) 41(6) International Journal of Consumer Studies 638–9.
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stakeholders making submissions.160 However, the use of Web 2.0 technologies led to that out-
come because barriers to participation were acknowledged and attention was given to them when
engagement processes were designed.161 For example, barriers to participation were surmounted
by developing ‘outreach plans’, which involved the use of conventional and social media, direct
communication with missing stakeholders and the enlistment of organisations and ‘opinion lead-
ers’ who could pass on consultation notices to their members; deploying techniques such as
‘information triage’, ‘translation’ and ‘information layering’;162 using independent facilitators
who educated interested parties about how to make written submissions; providing extensive
background information relevant to the specific rule-making exercise; emphasising that comments
can affect the outcome of the process; and sending messages that explained where and how public
comments had an impact on the process.
Empirical research, similar to that undertaken by Farina et al,163 into complaints handling by
regulatory bodies, ombuds and other alternative dispute resolution schemes, does not appear to
have been conducted. However, ombuds and alternative dispute resolution scholars are also
increasingly drawing attention to the design of complaints mechanisms and the effect design-
related choices may have on the accessibility of such schemes.164 Moreover, a range of measures
have been proposed and/or deployed to help overcome the barriers potential complainants face.
Some of these measures, many of which are comparable to strategies Farina et al165 found helpful
in the context of written submissions, include undertaking outreach activities, increasing media
presence and enhancing the capacity of staff to assist people with disabilities.166 Appointing
‘intermediaries’ such as community workers or elders to serve as representatives for ombuds in
local communities has also been suggested as a way to increase the number of complaints made by
Indigenous people.167
Application of the available research to the Australian co-regulatory rule-making context there-
fore suggests industry bodies and regulators are likely to increase the number of written submis-
sions and complaints they receive by addressing the various barriers identified above. Industry
bodies and regulators could begin to address them by increasing the funding consumer and public
interest organisations receive so they have the basic resources needed to make written submissions.
160. Farina et al, ‘Democratic Deliberation in the Wild’ (n 23) 1544–53, 1556–8, 1560–4, 1565–6; Farina, Newhart and
Heidt (n 122) 147–71.
161. See Farina et al, ‘Democratic Deliberation in the Wild’ (n 23); Farina, Newhart and Heidt (n 122); Cynthia R Farina
et al, ‘Rulemaking 2.0’ (2011) University of Miami Law Review 395; Cynthia R Farina and Mary J Newhart,
‘Rulemaking 2.0: Understanding and Getting Better Public Participation’ (Paper No 15, Cornell e-Rulemaking
Initiative Publications, 2013).
162. Information triage involves identifying the information citizens need to comment effectively and structuring it
accordingly. Translation requires rewriting information in plain English, using short sentences and avoiding jargon
and technical terminology. For more information about these and other techniques, see Farina et al, ‘Democratic
Deliberation in the Wild’ (n 23) 1556–8. See also Farina and Newhart (n 160) 21–37.
163. See above nn 23, 122, 159.
164. See, eg, Chris Gill et al, ‘Designing Consumer Redress: A Dispute System Design (DSD) Model for
Consumer-to-Business Disputes’ (2016) 36(3) Legal Studies 438; Brennan et al (n 158) 642–3.
165. See above nn 23, 122, 159.
166. Bernard Hubeau, ‘The Profile of Complainants: How to Overcome the “Matthew Effect”?’ in Marc Hertogh and
Richard Kirkham (eds), Research Handbook on the Ombuds (Edward Elgar, 2018) 259, 273. See also Productivity
Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements (Inquiry Report No 72, 5 September 2014) vol 1, 326–34.
167. Winangali Indigenous Communications and Research, Improving the Services of the Commonwealth Ombuds to
Australia’s Indigenous Peoples (Report, November 2010) 26.
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They could utilise modern technologies, including opportunities arising in a Web 2.0 environment,
and deploy techniques Farina et al and other scholars have identified to make participation and
complaints-handling more visible and accessible. However, these suggestions have a number of
significant limitations. First, despite calls from the Productivity Commission for more funding for
consumer and citizen organisations to engage in advocacy,168 the government has, with some
exceptions,169 been reluctant to adequately fund them. Industry has also not voluntarily offered
to pay consumers, citizens and related organisations to make written submissions. Second, the cost
of modifying written submission and complaints-handling processes is not insignificant, and it is
not guaranteed that, if implemented, the modifications will increase the number of complaints and
written submissions received. Increased funding for participation and the use of new technolo-
gies will not, for example, overcome the absence of trust in industry bodies or the lack of time
many individuals and smaller organisations have to engage in code development. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, even if industry bodies and ACMA were to make all required invest-
ments, any consequential increase in written submissions and complaints data is not likely to
adequately provide the ‘countervailing regulatory power’ needed to achieve responsiveness and
mitigate the risks of regulatory capture that co-regulatory rule-making generates.170
While written submissions may provide important information for consideration by industry
bodies, they are, as one consumer representative described complaints data, a ‘reactive way to
operate’.171 They do not allow for the inclusion of consumers, citizens and related organisations
early on in the rule-making process or require industry bodies to initiate direct contact with them.
Other engagement mechanisms, deployed when industry bodies perform the four functions of
rule-making, are much more likely to encourage industry bodies to weigh alternatives and
determine what (on balance) meets the needs of all stakeholders; to explain themselves to others;
to disclose a sufficient amount of relevant information to enable stakeholders and others to hold
them to account; and to exercise independent judgement. Some of these alternative mechanisms
and the statutory modifications needed to transfer the burden (and cost) of initiating and sustain-
ing engagement are considered below.
D Alternative Mechanisms and Necessary Statutory Modifications
A range of engagement mechanisms not currently or routinely used by the schemes we examined
are available. Surveys, for example, enable industry, using an array of means and technologies,
such as chatbots, to actively target and solicit contributions from consumers and citizens. Focus
groups and round tables (conducted in person or online) also provide opportunities for discussion
and dialogue—opportunities Consumer Round Table participants said they would welcome
because ‘it makes them feel like somebody wants to hear what they’ve got to say’.172 Citizen
168. See, eg, Productivity Commission, Consumer Law Enforcement and Administration (Final Report, March 2017) 217.
169. For example, pursuant to a five-year funding agreement, ACCAN received $2,296,000 (excluding GST) from the
federal government in 2018–19, but this funding is recovered from charges on telecommunications carriers, not
consolidated revenue. See Department of Communications and the Arts, Funding of Telecommunications
Consumer Representation Grants: Annual Report 2018–19 (December 2019) 4.
170. Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29) 83.
171. Statement by a representative from an organisation whose name was withheld (Consumer Round Table, 9 May 2019).
172. Ibid.
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juries173 have been used by water companies in the UK when preparing business plans for assess-
ment during price control reviews.174 Deliberative polling175 has been used by electricity compa-
nies in Texas to inform the development of ‘integrated resource plans’, submitted to the Public
Utility Commission, that set out how they intend to meet the current and future electricity needs of
customers within their service areas.176 Both mechanisms have the potential to more closely
approximate the dialogue that responsiveness in a co-regulatory rule-making context requires.177
However, the four criteria of responsiveness are unlikely to be satisfied unless one or more of
the above engagement mechanisms are used in conjunction with the appointment of representa-
tives from consumer and citizen interest organisations to industry advisory and working commit-
tees, especially if confidentiality is to remain a characteristic feature of co-regulatory
rule-making.178 Consumer representatives on industry working committees that operate by con-
sensus, in particular, can challenge industry by demanding it to provide reasons for its conduct and
to think through the actions it proposes to take to address underlying regulatory problems. They are
also privy to information that is exchanged between industry representatives serving on working
committees. In addition, consumer representatives push regulators to ask questions of and demand
possible solutions from industry.179 As an attendee at the Regulator Round Table stated, ‘The
benefit of a working committee is it can pull issues apart, get different perspectives on them and
then try to put something back [together] that makes sense.’180
Suggesting that representatives from consumer and citizen interest organisations should be
appointed to industry advisory and working committees is, of course, predicated on the assumption
that there is at least one consumer and citizen interest organisation willing to serve this function
and adequately resourced to perform it. It also assumes that one of the responsibilities of the
appointed consumer and citizen interest organisation is to create a network of other consumer and
citizen interest organisations (where they exist) and actively solicit and synthesise their views
during code development. Several round table participants highlighted that participation by con-
sumer and citizen interest representatives requires substantial time and resource commitments,
especially when issues to be addressed in codes are complex and contentious. It also requires
consumer and citizen interest organisations to have some knowledge of the markets in which the
members of industry bodies operate—knowledge that the Comms Alliance representative said
rendered ACCAN’s involvement in industry rule-making ‘much more efficient’.181 Network
173. For an explanation of this mechanism, see Gary E Marchant and Andrew Askland, ‘GM Foods: Potential Public
Consultation and Participation Mechanisms’ (2003) 44(1) Jurimetrics 99, 120–2.
174. See Robert Hahn, Robert Metcalfe and Florian Rundhammer, ‘Promoting Customer Engagement: A New Trend in
Utility Regulation’ (2020) 14(1) Regulation & Governance 121, 129–36.
175. For an explanation of this mechanism, see James S Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and
Public Consultation (Oxford University Press, 2009) 25–6.
176. Robert C Luskin, James S Fishkin and Dennis L Plane, Deliberative Polling and Policy Outcomes: Electric Utility
Issues in Texas (Paper, Annual Meeting of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, 4–7
November 1999) 3 <https://cdd.stanford.edu/wp-content/plugins/pdfjs-viewer-shortcode/pdfjs/web/viewer.php?
file¼/mm/2000/utility_paper.pdf&download¼true&print¼true&openfile¼tru>.
177. Further research (which is outside the scope of this article) is required before a citizen jury and/or a deliberative poll
could be designed for use in the context of industry rule-making.
178. See also Lee (n 36) 230–2; Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29) chs 3 and 4.
179. Lee (n 36) 230–1.
180. See above n 156.
181. Statement by a Comms Alliance representative (Industry Round Table, 10 May 2019).
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building is essential to capture the diversity of views held by consumer and citizen interest
organisations and (as at least one Regulator Round Table participant suggested) to identify areas
of agreement and difference.
The Department of Communications has acknowledged that there is ‘an ongoing need for
consumer participation in policy and regulatory processes’ in the telecommunications sector and
believes that ‘a telecommunications-specific consumer representative body [such as ACCAN,
which has 213 members, including 110 organisations and 103 individuals]182 remains an appro-
priate model to ensure effective consumer representation’.183 It has also committed funding for
ACCAN until 2022. Yet, there is no equivalent body, provided with the level of funding ACCAN
receives, representing citizen interests in the media sector,184 even though media regulation raises
important issues that directly affect citizen interests—issues such as content classification, and
integrity and quality of news and journalistic content. Extending ACCAN’s remit to include
media-related issues185 and/or creating a new citizen interest organisation especially for this
purpose could assist in overcoming the on-going audience fragmentation brought about by
video-on-demand services such as Netflix and the digital media platforms Google and Face-
book—a factor that likely contributes to the low number of complaints made to ACMA and written
submissions industry bodies in the media sector receive in response to draft codes. Such a body
could serve on industry advisory and working committees, facilitate the collation of comments
from disparate organisations and feed them into advisory and working committee discussions. It
could also emerge, as one Industry Round Table participant described ACCAN, as ‘a mediator’
between various groups. There are some potential drawbacks for responsiveness if a citizen interest
body were to perform that function. For example, media industry bodies might listen only to it and
would not be exposed to the conflicting viewpoints of various citizen stakeholders. However,
several representatives from consumer organisations at the Consumer Round Table who were
ACCAN members emphasised a body such as ACCAN was ‘approachable’ and created a ‘space’
where ‘a lot of different organisations but with similar issues . . . could compare notes’ and ‘boun-
ce . . . ideas around’.186 Establishing a similar space for citizens would promote greater engage-
ment and provide opportunities to educate them about participation in co-regulatory rule-making.
Any concerns about capture of the citizen interest body by industry bodies and their members
could be addressed by government allocating funding to the citizen interest body on a competitive
basis every five years, as it currently does for the telecommunications-specific consumer repre-
sentative body.187 Industry bodies would remain free to engage with other citizens and related
organisations. The funding needed for an expanded ACCAN and/or citizen interest organisation
182. ACCAN, Quarter 2, FY19–20 (Report, undated).
183. Department of Communications and the Arts, Review of Consumer Representation: Review of Section 593 of the
Telecommunications Act 1997: Final Report (February 2017) 8.
184. With some possible exceptions, such as the Consumer Policy Research Centre, existing generalist bodies and
associations such as the Public Interest Advocacy Centre and Human Rights Law Centre in Victoria have not been
heavily involved in communications-related debates.
185. ACCAN is funded to represent consumers of telecommunications and internet services. With the exception of direct
carrier billing, it does not focus on the customer-related aspects of content service provision (eg, billing and complaint
handling) across distribution platforms. It does not become involved in debates relating to content regulation.
186. Statement by a Country Women’s Association representative (Consumer Round Table, 9 May 2019).
187. On the importance of contestability and public interest groups, see Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29) 57.
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could be recovered from charges on broadcasters, content service providers and possibly the digital
platforms themselves.
Any decision by government to fund a public interest organisation for the media sector will
require the introduction of a provision in applicable legislation, comparable to s 593 in the Tele-
communications Act 1997 (Cth), that empowers the Minister to make a grant to that body for the
purpose of representing the public interest. It will also require legislation such as the Telecommu-
nications (Carrier Licence Charges) Act 1997 (Cth) that enables the Minister to levy charges on
telecommunications carriers. However, to bring about change to the current engagement practices of
industry bodies, the statutory criteria that must be satisfied before ACMA or the eSafety Commis-
sioner must register codes of practice also need to be modified in at least two significant ways.
First, all statutory frameworks for code development should be amended to require industry bodies
to engage comprehensively with the public, using mechanisms of engagement, such as surveys, focus
groups and round tables, specified by the relevant regulator from time to time in a legislative instru-
ment. It should be noted that recent research undertaken by ACMA in relation to broadcasting codes
has included, for the first time, surveys of viewers,188 and some industry bodies have on occasion
already used focus groups and round tables. However, this requirement expands the scope of current
public consultation obligations and ensures that responsibility for, and cost of, initiating engagement
lies with industry bodies, not individual consumers and citizens, who, as it has been shown, face a
number of impediments when that responsibility rests with them. It also requires the relevant regulator
to specify the engagement mechanisms it judges are best suited for ensuring consultation is compre-
hensive and gives it the flexibility to exclude mechanisms that fail to meet this objective and to include
new mechanisms that may be developed in the future that better achieve it.
Second, the registration criteria for codes should be amended to require regulators to be satisfied
that at least one body or association that represents the interests of consumers or citizens has been
appointed to, and has served on, a working committee or advisory body convened by the industry
body to prepare the code. Imposing such an obligation addresses a disparity that exists in the
current statutory frameworks for communications, thereby creating a level playing field for all
industry bodies. Even more importantly, it will provide opportunities for consumer and public
interest organisations to engage in critical dialogue with members of industry—opportunities that
most industry bodies currently fail to provide. Comms Alliance has often been seen as an outlier in
the sector because it permits consumer and citizen interest representatives to serve on its working
committees, but its practice serves as a model that all industry bodies should be required to follow
because it allows for the exchange of ideas between individual representatives of all interested
parties that responsiveness envisages.
In addition to these modifications, consideration may need to be given to providing regulators
with the power to determine the number of representatives from consumer and citizen interest
organisations who serve on industry working committees and/or requiring regulators to adopt a
consumer harm approach when evaluating the substance of codes.189 Consumer and regulator
representatives with experience of Comms Alliance processes commented that power imbalances
188. See ACMA, Impartiality and Commercial Influence in Broadcast News: Discussion Paper (January 2020). Although
ACMA has conducted audience research in the past, this has almost exclusively related to rules it formulates itself.
189. The concept of harm is used in competition and consumer law as well as regulation in Australia and worldwide. See,
eg, KJ Cseres, ‘The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard’ (2007) 3(2) Competition Law Review 121;
Regulating Harms (n 1) 22–3.
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between industry and consumer representatives may adversely affect the way in which discussion
unfolds on working committees,190 and these mechanisms were suggested as two of the ways in
which these imbalances could be redressed. However, further research and analysis are needed to
determine if they are warranted or would adequately address the underlying concern identified by
consumer and regulator representatives.
V Conclusion
If co-regulatory rule-making in the communications industry (as well as other industries) is to be
responsive, engagement with consumers and citizens is essential. However, it must be acknowl-
edged that ‘mass participation’191 by consumers and citizens in code development—an assumption
that arguably underpins current statutory procedural requirements relating to consumer and public
consultation—is unlikely. As the analysis has shown, although citizens and consumers have
knowledge that they can contribute to the rule-making process, they face a number of hurdles that
render their participation difficult. The skills, knowledge, time, confidence and resilience required
to participate in co-regulatory rule-making all create significant impediments that hinder consumer
and citizen involvement. Code registration requirements relating to consumer and public consulta-
tion must therefore seek to ensure that industry bodies engage with consumers and citizens using
mechanisms (other than written submissions) that accomplish the same functions that participation
by a significant number of fully engaged consumers and citizens in industry rule-making per-
forms—deliberation, consideration, transparency and accountability (as defined). As the regula-
tory frameworks for the converged communications industry and digital platforms continue to
evolve, legislators, government, policymakers, and regulators are urged to set their expectations
for consumer and citizen engagement in co-regulatory rule-making accordingly. By not ensuring
adequate consumer and citizen engagement, the regulatory framework for the communications
industry is unlikely to ever achieve responsiveness—the regulatory tool that legislators and gov-
ernment have accepted will facilitate the achievement of the wider public policy goals they have
set for the sector.
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